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Monte Carlo Simulations arrive at their results by introducing randomness, 
sometimes derived from a physical randomizing device. Nonetheless, we 
argue, they open no new epistemic channels beyond that already employed by 
traditional simulations: the inference by ordinary argumentation of 
conclusions from assumptions built into the simulations. We show that Monte 
Carlo simulations cannot produce knowledge other than by inference; and 
that they resemble other computer simulations in the manner in which they 
derive their conclusions. Simple examples of Monte Carlo simulations are 
analyzed to identify the underlying inferences.  
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1. Introduction 
 Monte Carlo simulations exploit randomness to arrive at their results. Figuratively 
speaking, the outcomes of coin tosses repeatedly direct the course of the simulation. 
These Monte Carlo simulations comprise a case of special interest in the epistemology of 
simulations, that is, in the study of the source of the knowledge supplied by simulations. 
For they would seem, at first look, to be incompatible with the epistemology of 
simulation we hold. Following Beisbart (forthcoming) and Stöckler (2000), we hold that 
simulations are merely arguments, albeit quite elaborate ones, and their results are 
recovered fully by inferences from the assumptions presumed. 
 Tossing coins, rolling dice, spinning roulette wheels, drawing entries from tables 
of random numbers or taking the outputs from computational pseudo-randomizers all 
seem quite remote from the deliberate inferential steps of an argument. Indeed, this 
reliance on randomness makes these Monte Carlo simulations look more like real 
experiments. For the outcome of a real experiment is learned only by doing the 
experiment. We cannot know in advance whether a test group will fare better under the 
treatment, which particles will be produced at novel energies in an accelerator, or which 
micro-organisms will be found to be thriving when we look through our microscope. We 
need to do the experiments to discover the results. They are not inferred. 
 Correspondingly, the whole point of randomizing seems to be the injection of an 
element into the simulation that cannot be known in advance. Just as we cannot know 
antecedently into which direction the particle in the accelerator will be scattered, we 
cannot know whether the randomizer coin will fall heads or tails. The Monte Carlo 
roulette wheel must be spun before we can know the random number it will inject at that 
step into the simulation. It is to be discovered. It is not to be inferred. 
 Considerations such as these suggest the view that Monte Carlo simulations are 
conceived more properly as experiments. Dietrich (1996, pp. 344-47) argues that Monte 
Carlo simulations share the same basic structure as controlled experiments and reports the 
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view among geneticists who use them that they were “thought to be much the same as 
ordinary experiments” (ibid., pp. 346-47).1  
Even if Monte Carlo simulations do not form experiments, they may challenge 
our view that simulations are merely arguments. Humphreys (1994, pp. 112-113) allows 
that Monte Carlo simulations are not experiments properly speaking. However, he does 
not allow the natural alternative that they are merely a numerical technique of 
approximation, such as truncation of an infinite series of addends (p. 113). Rather, he 
denies that the simulations form a method of “abstract inference” (p. 112) because they 
are more experiment-like and generate representations of sample trajectories of concrete 
particles. Humphreys’ conclusion is that Monte Carlo simulations form a new scientific 
method, which occupies the middle ground between experiment and numerical methods 
and which he dubs “numerical experimentation” (p. 112). Humphreys’ analysis is not 
entirely clear on whether this middle ground employs novel epistemic modes of access to 
the world, distinct from those of the two extremes of experiment and the inferences of 
numerical methods. 
 Our purpose in this paper is to reaffirm that, as far as their epistemic access to the 
world is concerned, Monte Carlo simulations are merely elaborate arguments or 
inferences. In this regard they do not differ from other simulations. Our case is twofold. 
First, indirectly, Monte Carlo simulations could not be anything else. Simulations, Monte 
Carlo or otherwise, do not gain knowledge of parts of the world by interacting with them, 
as do ordinary experiments. They are closed systems that can only return knowledge of 
the world external to them in so far as that knowledge is introduced in the presumptions 
used to set up the simulation. They can then exploit that knowledge to yield their results 
by an inferentially reliable procedure, that is, by one that preserves truth or the 
probability of truth. Second, directly, an inspection of Monte Carlo simulations shows 
them merely to be a sequence of inferences no different from an ordinary derivation, with 
the addition of some complications. These are: there are very many more individual 
inferences than in derivations normally carried out by humans with pencil and paper; the 
                                                 
1 Morrison (2009) maintains that many computer simulations, Monte Carlo or not, are experiments because 
they draw on models in the same way as experiments do.  
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choice of which inferences to make is directed by a randomizer; and there are meta level 
arguments that the results are those sought in spite of the random elements and 
approximations used.  
 Our thesis is a narrow one. We are concerned solely with the epistemological 
problem of how Monte Carlo simulations can give us knowledge of the world.2. In other 
ways, Monte Carlo simulations are like experiments that discover novel results. We 
might say that the random numbers they use are introduced as many, little novel 
discoveries. The simulations proceed at a high level of opacity so that their results cannot 
easily be anticipated, much as we cannot anticipate the outcomes of truly novel 
experiments.3 We will argue, however, that these sorts of similarities are superficial. 
They may make Monte Carlo simulations look like experiments in some aspects. But they 
do not and cannot make them function like real experiments epistemically. It is this 
epistemic aspect that is of concern in this paper. 
 In Section 2, we review briefly how Monte Carlo simulations work. In Section 3, 
we begin our main argument by reviewing the two modes of epistemic access open to 
experiments and simulations: discovery and inference. Sections 4 and 5 make the indirect 
and direct cases for our thesis. In Section 6, we illustrate our thesis by reconstructing 
some instances of Monte Carol simulations explicitly as arguments. In Section 7, we 
respond to objections. 
2. Monte Carlo Simulations 
What are Monte Carlo simulations and how do they work? In a broader sense, 
Monte Carlo simulation is a method that uses random numbers to carry out a calculation.4 
                                                 
2 There are many other fascinating aspects to Monte Carlo simulations. See e.g. Humphreys (1994) and 
Galison (1997, Ch. 8). See also Anderson (1987), Eckhardt (1987), the papers in the first part of Gubernatis 
(2003) and Hitchcock (2003) for the history of Monte Carlo simulations. 
3 The epistemic opacity of computer simulations is stressed by Humphreys, 2004, pp. 148–50.  
4 A more appropriate expression is “Monte Carlo method” or “Monte Carlo technique”. See e.g. James, 
1980, p. 1147 for a definition. Consult Hammersley & Handscomb (1967), Halton (1970) and James (1980) 
for reviews about this method. 
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Monte Carlo integration is the prime example of this technique.5 In a narrower sense, 
Monte Carlo simulations trace physical processes. Simulations of both kinds are 
arguments, or so we will argue.  
 Suppose our task is to evaluate the expectation value of a random variable f. 
Assume that we have a uniform probability distribution over the interval [0,1] and that 
our random variable returns 21 x for every x from [0,1]. We can estimate the 
expectation value, E(f), from the average over independent realizations of the probability 
model. We use N random numbers xi following a uniform distribution over [0,1], apply f 
and take the average. Our estimate is: 
  
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iN xf
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This is the most basic Monte Carlo method.  
 Random variables are extremely useful in the natural sciences. A pollen particle 
suspended in certain liquids undergoes a zigzag motion that looks random. The motion is 
called Brownian, and so is the particle. Brownian motion is described by random 
variables. For each time t, the position of the particle is the value of a random variable 
X(t). A model can relate the probability distribution over X(t) to the distribution at an 
earlier time t’. In a simple discrete random walk model, time is discrete, the motion of the 
particle is confined to the nodes of a grid, and at every instance of time t = 1, 2, …, the 
particle jumps to one of the neighboring nodes, following some probability distribution.6 
We can use this model to make predictions, for example, about the expected position of 
the particle at later times or about the probability that the particle is within a certain 
region of space. We start from the initial position of the particle, X(0), and use a sequence 
of random numbers to determine positions X(1), X(2) and so on successively. This 
produces one sample path/sample trajectory, that is, one possible course the particle could 
take. To estimate the expected position or the probability of the particle being in a certain 
region of space, we average over a large number of sample trajectories. These 
                                                 
5 See e.g. James (1980, Sec. 2) for an introduction to Monte Carlo integration. 
6 See Lemons (2002) for a readable introduction to the related physics. 
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calculations undertaken for pollen grains are simulations in the narrow sense because 
they trace a physical process. They are computer simulations in the sense defined by 
Humphreys (2004, p. 110) because they evaluate a model of a physical process in the 
world. 
 Monte Carlo methods can also be applied to problems that do not involve 
randomness. To see this, note that the expectation value E(f) can be written as 
 
1
0
2
1
0
2 1)(1)( xdxxpxdxfE . 
The second equality holds because we have assumed a flat probability density over [0,1]. 
Consequently, our Monte Carlo method has estimated the value of the integral 
 
1
0
21 xdx , 
(1) 
which is known to equal /4. More generally, the value of an integral 

b
a
xgdx )(  
for an integrable function g and real numbers a < b can be approximated using random 
numbers. The integral can be rewritten as 
ab
xgdxab
b
a
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The last factor, 1/(b – a), is the probability density for a probability model with a uniform 
distribution over [a,b]. To obtain the value of the integral, we use N independent random 
numbers xi following a uniform distribution over [a,b] and take the average over g(xi): 
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This method is called Monte Carlo integration. It differs from other methods of 
approximating the value of an integral numerically, such as the trapezoidal rule,7 because 
                                                 
7 Consult Press et al. (1992, Ch. 4) for details.  
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it uses random points instead of a regular grid to sample the interval. Monte Carlo 
integration can be generalized and refined in many ways; it is particularly successful for 
higher-dimensional integrals. It has been shown that every Monte Carlo method reduces 
to Monte Carlo integration (James, 1980, p. 1148).  
 In applying a Monte Carlo method, we use random numbers that follow a certain 
probability distribution. To obtain such numbers, we can draw on the outcomes of a 
physical random process.8 Alternatively, we can use a pseudo-random number generator. 
This is a deterministic algorithm that returns a series of numbers following a certain 
probability distribution.9 In practice, it does not matter how we obtain the random 
numbers as long as they follow the intended probability model. Whether or not they do so 
is often ascertained using statistical tests (see e.g. James, 1980, pp. 1170–72).  Often, the 
tests check whether the frequencies of the numbers in certain intervals match those 
predicted by the probability model. If we have 100 random numbers with a uniform 
distribution over [0,1], approximately 50 random numbers should be in [0, .5]. The 
random numbers generated by some pseudo-random generators have even been 
characterized analytically (ibid., p. 1172).10 
 Since a Monte Carlo integration uses random numbers, its results are random. If 
we run the method twice using different random numbers, the results will differ. In either 
case, the result will not coincide with the exact value of the integral. The difference 
between the outcome of the method and the exact value of /4 is called error, and, in the 
                                                 
8 See Tocher (1975, Ch. 5) for the generation of random numbers via physical random processes. 
9 See e.g. Hammersley & Handscomb (1967, Ch. 3), Tocher (1975, Ch. 6), James (1980, pp. 1167–1165) 
and Knuth (2000, Ch. 3) for the generation of pseudo-random numbers. 
10 Here we define random numbers probabilistically. That is, a sequence of numbers is random just if they 
fit the requisite probabilistic model. It is a matter of considerable discussion just what it is for random 
numbers to fit some probabilistic model. These issues go beyond the scope of the present paper and will not 
be addressed here. It is sufficient for our purposes that, as a practical matter in Monte Carlo simulations, a 
large sequence of numbers would not be accepted as conforming to a uniform distribution over [0,1] if all 
the numbers are clustered close to some particular value, such as 0.25, even though there is some very 
small probability that just such a clustering may happen. This sequence and other pathological sequences 
like it would be rejected in favor of ones whose members are more uniformly distributed over [0,1]. 
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case of Monte Carlo simulations, the error is statistical. In practice, the error is not a 
problem since the method converges probabilistically (James, 1980, p. 1151). Suppose 
that we can only tolerate an error smaller than > 0 in the evaluation of the integraland 
that we want the outcome to be within this error bound with a probability of p, say 99%. 
Probabilistic convergence assures us that, if we use more than some specific number of 
random points, we can keep our error within the tolerable bounds with a probability 
higher than p. What that number is depends on the details of our problem.  
 As an illustration, we have run Monte Carlo simulations to approximate the value 
of /4 (Eq. 1). For the pseudo-random number generator, we choose the linear 
congruential generator 
Xi+1 = (1664525 Xi + 1013904223) (mod 2
32) . 
(2) 
The resulting set of random numbers is almost perfectly uniformly distributed over the 
interval [0, 232).11 Hence, the numbers ri = Xi/2
32 follow a uniform distribution on the 
unit interval.  The pseudo-random number generator has to be initialized using a number 
in [0, 232). We have used different initial values and different values of N (the number of 
random numbers) to obtain Monte Carlo estimates of the value of the integral: 
  
N
i i
r
N
dxx
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21
0
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1
14/ . 
(3) 
The results are shown in Table 1. They illustrate that the approximations to the integral 
tend to approach one another and to converge to the true value of the integral (/4  
.785398), as N increases. 
 
Initial value  X0 N = 100 N = 1,000 N = 10,000 value of /4 
0 .816315 .795922 .785052 .785398 
1 .773266 .774889 .787492 .785398 
                                                 
11 See Press et al. (1992, p. 284). 
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Caption of Table 1: Results of several Monte Carlo integrations of the integral in (Eq. 1), 
which equals /4. We obtain random numbers following (Eq. 2) for various combinations 
of the initial value X0 and the number N of random numbers used. 
 
 Monte Carlo simulations use random numbers to evaluate mathematical 
expressions. These expressions may have a probabilistic meaning or not. The method 
converges to the true result in a probabilistic manner as the number of random points is 
increased. The last few decades have seen many further developments of Monte Carlo 
methods, which we need not pursue in what follows, since they do not alter any matters 
of basic principle.  
3. What Powers our Epistemic Activities 
How can simulations give us knowledge of the world? We distinguish two modes 
as the sole options. 
3.1 Discovery 
 Discovery—here always understood as empirical discovery—goes directly to the 
world. We observe the world to learn about it. In an experiment, we do this in a particular 
way. We contrive some artificial arrangement in nature and watch what happens.12 In his 
celebrated experiments, Millikan (1913) suspended electrically charged oil drops in an 
electric field to determine the charge of a single electron. Cavendish (1798) used a 
torsion balance to determine the gravitational force of attraction between lead masses. 
While Millikan and Cavendish contrived the arrangements, the experimental outcomes 
depend essentially on what then manifests in the apparatus. 
 A complication is that most experiments are not purely discovery. What we call 
an experimental result is commonly obtained with the help of inferences. To declare an 
experimental result for the universal natural constant e, the “elementary electric charge,” 
Millikan had to generalize the behavior of the few electrons measured in his apparatus to 
all electrons. Cavendish required some delicate inferences to calibrate his torsion balance. 
                                                 
12 See Heidelberger (2005) and Radder (2009) for the notion of scientific experiment. 
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We will not pursue these inferences here since they merely mold and generalize what 
powers the experiment epistemically: the novel experience provided by the behavior of 
the apparatus. They are not essential to an experiment.  
3.2 Inference 
 The second mode requires no contact with the world and thus is not self-
sufficient. It transforms knowledge of the world already gained. If this transformation is 
to be reliable, it must be truth preserving, and hence a deductive inference; or preserving 
the probability of truth, and hence an inductive inference of great strength. Investigations 
in this mode are powered epistemically by the knowledge of the world introduced at the 
outset. They can nevertheless produce new knowledge simply because the results inferred 
were not known prior to the investigations. 
 Thought experiments, Norton (2004) maintains, operate this way. They are 
merely picturesque arguments that make inferences from presumptions implicit in the 
description of the thought experiment scenario. Since human imaginative powers do play 
a role, it is not immediately apparent that prosaic inference is all that is employed. It is 
fashionable and enticing to imagine that thought experiments are able to tap into some 
mysterious new epistemic channel. Norton requires fairly elaborate argumentation to 
establish that they do not do this. 
 As Beisbart (forthcoming) has argued, the case of computer simulations is more 
straightforward than that of thought experiments. How simulations work is transparent in 
the sense that they consist of a large number of simple steps, typically programmed into a 
computer. A sufficiently patient monitor could trace the entire simulation step by step 
from start to finish. No peculiarly human powers of imagination enter. A simulation does 
not differ in kind from a derivation from some suitably collected set of assumptions. 
Rather it differs in degree. It tends to use simpler and weaker steps, but compensates for 
their weakness by employing very many of them. 
 An example illustrates this. The angular displacement  of a simple pendulum of 
length L at time t is governed by the differential equation 
d2/dt2 = – (g/L) sin  
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where g is the gravitational acceleration at the surface of the earth. One can determine the 
motion for small displacements by approximating sin    and noting that the equation 
is reduced to  
d2/dt2 = – (g/L)  
It is solved, for example, by 
(t) = max cos ((g/L)
1/2t) 
for max the maximum displacement. This argument is recognized as a classic derivation 
in mechanics. Meta-analysis restricts the domain in which the result can be used with 
acceptable error. 
 Alternatively, one can perform a step-wise integration. In the simple but 
inefficient Euler method, one starts from momentary rest at t = 0 at the maximum 
displacement (0) = max, where the initial angular velocity is zero and the angular 
acceleration is  – (g/L) sin max . One can then approximate the motion over the next 
small time interval t by assuming that the acceleration is unchanged. One recovers 
(t) = max – (1/2) (g/L) sin max (t)
2
 .  
The process is iterated to recover the angular position and speed for later times 2t, 3t, 
4t, 5t, … If this step-wise integration is performed on a computer, we have a simple 
computer simulation. Meta-analysis is also needed to assure us that the errors introduced 
by the approximations are acceptably small. For the inefficient Euler method, a standard 
theorem (Young and Gregory, 1972, p. 447) assures us that, for generically well-behaved 
systems, the error in integrating over some fixed time increases roughly linearly with the 
step size t. As a practical convenience, we can estimate the size of the error by halving 
the step size and checking how much the final result changes. That change is, very 
roughly, half the total error of the original estimate. 
 
 Clearly there are great pragmatic differences between the two procedures of 
derivation and step-wise integration. The first is easy for a human to carry out with pencil 
and paper. The second requires assistance from some computing device. However they 
do not differ in the epistemic element of concern to us here: they both proceed as 
inferences from the presumption of the original differential equation. The derivation 
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proceeded from the approximation sin    . It converted the equation into one whose 
solution is in the standard repertoire of introductory mathematics texts. The simulation 
employed a coarser and less powerful approximation of the constancy of acceleration 
over a short time period. It enabled us to look forward by a small time interval after 
which the approximation needed to be repeated. Meta-analysis—sometimes trivial, 
sometimes not—is needed in both cases to determine the accuracy of the results.  
3.3 The Only Possibilities 
 These two modes—discovery and inference—exhaust those suitable for the 
epistemology of simulation. To see that they are exhaustive, note that all suitable modes 
must belong to one of two classes: those that depend essentially on contact with the 
world; and those that do not. In the first class, we require that contact to be either passive 
or active. Passive contact is observation. Active contact, or at least active contact that 
improves epistemically on passive contact, is experimentation. So the first class is what 
we have called discovery. In the second class, we must proceed without any new contact 
of the world. That is, as noted above, we must transform what we already know by a 
procedure that preserves truth or its probability. That is, this second class is inference.13 
 That these two modes exhaust the relevant possibilities will provide a premise for 
our indirect argument below. 
4. Monte Carlo Simulations are Arguments: The Indirect Case 
 Our claim is that, epistemically, Monte Carlo simulations are arguments. We 
assert this even though they are in many ways unlike other, more familiar arguments. 
They are hugely complex so that it is impractical for a human to follow through their 
steps, whereas arguments are normally carried out by humans. They are distinctive in that 
their steps are governed by random or pseudo-random processes, whereas ordinary 
                                                 
13 One might imagine other epistemic modes. In the context of thought experiments, Brown (2004) has 
proposed that we can learn of the world through a Platonic perception of the ideal forms of the laws of 
nature. Because of the transparency of the individual steps of simulations, we believe that there is no role 
for these exotic modes.  
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argumentation does not include randomly chosen inferences. However these differences 
are unimportant for our concern of what powers Monte Carlo simulations epistemically. 
They are arguments. They deliver their results by transforming presumptions built into 
their set ups in a way that preserves truth (deductive inference) or a way that preserves its 
probability (strong inductive inference). 
 We make our case indirectly and directly. Indirectly, we argue in this section that 
they could be nothing else. Directly, in the next section, we review the operation of 
Monte Carlo simulations and find that they are merely many inferences assembled.  
 Indirectly, we arrive at the conclusion that Monte Carlo simulations are arguments 
by elimination, that is, by a disjunctive syllogism. The first premise is that Monte Carlo 
simulations are powered epistemically either by what we have called “discovery” or by 
what we have called “inference” in the last section, whose principal burden was to 
establish that premise. The second premise is that Monte Carlo simulations are not 
powered epistemically by discovery. Hence, by disjunctive syllogism, they are powered 
by inference. 
 The second premise requires a little discussion. For Monte Carlo simulations can 
employ real physical systems as randomizers. This is a type of contact with the external 
world. However it is not the type that is required for discovery. A method only includes 
discovery if hitherto unknown properties characteristic of a particular physical system are 
recorded. It is the incorporation of these previously unknown properties that furnishes 
discovery its epistemic power. In Monte Carlo simulations, by contrast, physical 
randomizers are used in a manner carefully designed to eradicate any influence of their 
peculiar properties. Monte Carlo simulations can use any of many possible physical 
randomizers without the change of randomizer making any difference to the outcome. 
The randomizer can vary from truly random processes provided by quantum systems, 
such as the random clicks of a Geiger counter near a radioactive source; to the effectively 
random processes supplied to thermal noise in an electronic circuit; to properly executed 
casino randomizers, such as roulette wheels. All that matters is that the devices provide 
numbers with the requisite distribution, where that distribution has been specified ahead 
of any physical contact with the randomizer. Thus the randomizers are designed to 
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suppress completely exactly that aspect of the contact with the world that powers 
discovery epistemically. 
 Finally, a physical randomizer can be replaced entirely by the computer code of a 
pseudo-randomizer without any harmful effect or even any discernible effect on the 
Monte Carlo simulation. That replacement displays most clearly that a Monte Carlo 
simulation does not require contact with the randomizer as an external physical object. 
Hence the simulation cannot implement “discovery” for that mode requires such contact.  
5 Monte Carlo Simulations are Arguments: the Direct Case 
In so far as Monte Carlo simulations carry out calculations that trace the dynamics 
of a system, direct examination shows them to be arguments or inferences, as sketched in 
Section 3.2 above. What remains to be shown here is that the introduction of 
randomization does not change this assessment. 
 We can break the problem down into two sub-problems according to whether the 
Monte Carlo simulation is used merely to compute some mathematical quantity or 
whether it is used to imitate a physical system. In both, following the discussion of 
Section 4, we will not distinguish physical randomizers from pseudo-randomizers since 
the difference between them is immaterial to the functioning of Monte Carlo simulations. 
5.1 Computing a Mathematical Quantity 
 We have seen in Section 2 that Monte Carlo simulations can be used merely to 
compute a mathematical quantity. The simulation employs mathematical structures only: 
sets, functions and the like. The simulation consists of computations or mathematical 
derivations—inferences—that employ these structures. Randomization adds the 
complication that the final outcome must be interpreted probabilistically: the result is 
likely not exactly correct, but very likely close to the correct result. This assurance is 
recovered from a meta-level inference about the derivation. The entirety of the 
simulation, if a pseudo-random number generator is used, simply is a derivation in 
mathematics. 
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 This is illustrated in the Monte Carlo computation of /4 in Section 2. The basic 
structure is the set {ri}, generated by the formula in (Eq. 2), and the summation over it of 
(Eq. 3). The resulting values of Table 1 are generated by direct computation. A meta level 
argument assures us that the numbers in the set {ri} are uniformly distributed over the 
unit interval for most of the initial values X0 that we may use to seed the generator of (Eq. 
2) and that, as a result, the summation of (Eq. 3) will be very close to /4. 
 That the introduction of randomization is benign can be illustrated with a simple 
but computationally impractical example in which we introduce randomization in two 
steps. Consider the problem of summing all the integers from 1 to 1,000,000. We could 
find it directly by summing 1+2+3+…. Or we could use a randomizer to select a different 
order in which to sum, say 56,723 + 2 + 899,765 + …. In this second case, the intrusion 
of randomness does not alter the outcome; addition is associative and gives the same 
result whatever the order. Using a randomizer to select the order corresponds, 
figuratively, to putting all the numbers in an urn, drawing them randomly without 
replacement and adding them in the order they are drawn. A more efficient process 
requires us to draw a small random sample of the entire set, sum them and scale up the 
sum of the sample to estimate the sum of the totality. It turns out that a very small 
sample, drawn with replacement, is sufficient to get a good estimate. Merely drawing 
10,000 numbers, which is just 1% of the totality, will yield a result that is likely within 
1.15% of the correct answer.14 This last procedure corresponds to a Monte Carlo 
simulation of the integral  
5.000,000,1
5.0x
xdx . 
                                                 
14 The N  random variables Xi , i = 1, … , N are uniformly and independently distributed over the integers 
{1, …, M = 1,000,000}. The estimate of the sum 2/)1(
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. Two standard deviations, expressed as a fraction of the 
mean, is approximately 

2/ 3N , which supplies the 1.15% error of the text when N=10,000.  
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5.2 Simulating a Physical System 
 Consider now the case of Monte Carlo simulations of real physical systems. This 
case can be dealt with quickly, for it reduces to the case of computing a mathematical 
quantity of Section 5.1. The preparation for a Monte Carlo simulation of some real 
physical system is the developing of a mathematical description of the system. The 
Monte Carlo simulation itself is merely the derivation within this mathematical 
description of some quantity, exactly akin to what we have seen in Section 5.1. 
 For example, we may model Brownian motion as a discrete random walk as 
described in Section 2. Then each possible trajectory of the particle over 1,000 time units 
is represented by adding 1,000 numbers, each number representing a possible step. The 
related addition is a purely mathematical operation. The statistical parameters of the 
motion, such as its mean, its variance, the mean time for return to the origin, and so on 
arise from sums over all possible trajectories. Monte Carlo simulations estimate the 
related sums by summing only over a randomly selected subclass of possible trajectories. 
This is analogous to summing over a random selection of numbers to obtain the value of 
a sum or an integral.15  
6. What is the inference of a Monte Carlo simulation? 
 There is direct and indirect evidence then to the effect that a Monte Carlo 
simulation is an argument. But what exactly is this argument? We have argued that it has 
two parts: the inferences of the computation itself, typically carried out by an electronic 
computer; and the arguments of a meta-analysis that assure us that the intended results 
have been attained. The purpose of this section is to display the arguments in our main 
examples of Monte Carlo simulations.  
We return first to the Monte Carlo integration that estimates the numerical value 
of /4. Consider the integration with initial value X0 = 0 and N = 10,000 random numbers 
(see Table 1). The primary argument consists in the computation of the members of the 
set of random numbers {ri} by the linear congruential generator (4) and its substitution 
                                                 
15 This argument illustrates why every Monte Carlo method performs a Monte Carlo integration.  
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into the summation formula   
N
i i
r
n 1
2
1
1
to arrive at the result .785052. This argument 
is merely a large set of simple arithmetic inferences performed by an electronic computer. 
It would be impractical and unilluminating to display them here. The argument of the 
meta-analysis is more delicate and more interesting. It assures us that the result .785052 
has the significance intended. That argument is reconstructed in outline as 
P1. The 10,000 random numbers {ri} are uniformly distributed over [0,1]. 
P2. Substituting these random numbers into the Monte Carlo estimator 
  
n
i i
r
n 1
2
1
1
gives the value .785052 . 
P3. If the set {ri} is large and uniformly distributed, the Monte Carlo estimator 
  
n
i i
r
n 1
2
1
1
 of the integral 

 / 4  1 x2
0
1
 dx  very probably 
approximately equals its true value/4. 
C. /4 very probably is approximately .785052.  
 
 The conclusion C states the result of the Monte Carlo simulation. It is qualitative 
because the error tolerance and the probability with which the error tolerance is met are 
not specified numerically. If the error tolerance and the respective probability are known, 
C could be rendered more precise.  
 The conclusion C is probabilistic in character. While we cannot enter here into the 
thorny problem of explicating probability, it is sufficient for our purposes that an 
objective notion is used and that this objective notion assures us of a close association 
between the relative frequencies of random numbers and the corresponding probabilities 
for large sets of random numbers. That Monte Carlo integration converges 
probabilistically has been proven quite generally, at least if the function to be integrated 
is well-behaved (see James, 1980, p. 1150). This general result does not entail how 
quickly a particular Monte Carlo integration converges. For some applications of the 
method, it is possible to obtain exact bounds on the error and the respective probabilities. 
For other applications, no such bounds are known, but they may be estimated from 
simulations. 
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 The Monte Carlo simulation that estimates  /4 is merely a mathematical 
computation. We argued in Section 5.2 above that Monte Carlo simulations of physical 
systems reduce to analogous mathematical computations, using Brownian motion as an 
illustration. But since the results of such Monte Carlo simulations have empirical 
meaning, we can reconstruct the arguments associated with such simulations in a more 
illuminating way.  We consider a simulation that provides the expected position of a 
Brownian particle after 1,000 time steps. 
 A Monte Carlo simulation of Brownian motion depends on the probability model 
that specifies the probability distribution p for the Brownian particle moving to each 
accessible position at some time t, given its position at an immediately antecedent time t 
– 1. The computation within the simulation that delivers the position for one sample 
trajectory after 1,000 time steps implements an argument that can be summarized as: 
 
P1’. The initial position of the sample trajectory at time t = 0 is X(0) = 0 (in 
suitable units and coordinates). 
P2’(t). (t = 0 to 999) If the position of the sample trajectory at time t is )(tX , then 
its position at time t + 1, )1( tX  = trtX )( , where the rt sample the 
probability distribution  p.16  
Cc’. The position of the sample trajectory at time t = 1,000 is r = 

000,1
1t
tr  .  
The premises P2’(t) follow the same scheme that yields 1,000 individual premises as t 
takes values from 0 to 999. The conclusion Cc’ follows from these premises in 
conjunction with P1’.17 
The computation of a single sample trajectory is, in general, not useful by itself, 
since trajectories will vary considerably in their details. Our goal in the simulation is to 
obtain statistical features of the entirety of sample trajectories. These are recovered from 
                                                 
16 As explained in Sec. 2 above, this is meant to say that certain frequencies in the random numbers ri 
closely match those predicted by the probability model p. 
17 A similar type of argument is carried out by a computer simulation that uses deterministic equations to 
follow the dynamics of a system (Beisbart, forthcoming). 
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statistical estimators. We may estimate the expected or mean final position by computing 
the average of the final positions of many—N, say—trajectories. An argument in the 
meta-analysis assures us of the final result:  
  
P3’. The expected final position of the particle is very probably the average final 
position of the large number of N randomly chosen sample trajectories of 
the probability model. 
P4’. The average over N such randomly chosen sample trajectories takes the value 
rav.18 
C’. The expected position of the particle, )000,1(X , very probably is 
approximately rav.  
 
Premise P4’ asserts the average of the results of the conclusions of the many arguments 
P1, P2’,Cc’ associated with the many simulations of the N individual trajectories. 
 
Altogether, we have two kinds of argument: a series of arguments that derive the 
final positions of sample trajectories; and a meta-level argument that infers the result. The 
execution of the former, lower-level arguments requires the most computational effort. 
The meta-level argument is essential if we are to obtain the final result.  
 
7. Distractions and Objections 
 
 We believe that we have established that Monte Carlo simulations are merely 
arguments like other simulations. Nonetheless, there are distractions that still may appear 
to press Monte Carlo simulations towards real experiments. We list some here and 
respond to them. 
                                                 
18 As explained in Sec. 2 above, this is meant to say that certain frequencies in the random numbers ri 
closely match those predicted by the probability model p. 
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1. Monte Carlo Simulations depend upon randomness, which is non-inferential. 
So how can they be arguments? 
 
It is true that Monte Carlo simulations appear, initially, to be quite different from 
other simulations because of the essential role of randomness. This appearance is 
deceptive, for randomness can have no role or only a minimal one in the final results if 
they are to be credible. Otherwise Monte Carlo simulations would be little better than 
forecasting by reading tea leaves or shuffling tarot cards, whose results are mostly 
expressions of random chance. The results of a good Monte Carlo simulation are not. 
They are repeatable and reliable. 
 While one properly generated random number is unpredictable, the behavior of a 
large collection of independent random numbers is highly regular. This fact is well-
known from the Laws of large numbers.19 Exploiting this regularity is what enables 
Monte Carlo simulations to eliminate the vagaries of chance and to return reliable, 
repeatable results.  
As we have shown above, a well-designed Monte Carlo simulation minimizes the 
role of randomness. Probabilistic convergence of Monte Carlo simulations guarantees 
that the errors become arbitrarily small. It is true that there is always a small probability 
of a Monte Carlo simulation producing an incorrect result. But this probability can be 
made arbitrarily small. In this sense, the role of randomness is minimized.20  
 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Feller, 1968, Ch. 10.  
20 The point is nicely put by James (1980, p. 1151): The name “Monte Carlo simulation” is particularly 
fitting “because the style of gambling in the Monte Carlo casino, not to be confused with the noisy and 
tasteless gambling houses of Las Vegas and Reno, is serious and sophisticated.” He further comments 
(ibid.): “The apparent contradiction between the unpredictability of the gambling process and the 
seriousness of the results is one of the fascinating aspects of the Monte Carlo method which has been 
responsible for a great deal of the interest shown in the method but has also resulted in considerable 
confusion and misunderstanding.” 
 21 
2. The randomness within Monte Carlo simulations is akin to the unpredictable, 
novel character of data supplied by real experiments. So why are Monte Carlo 
simulations not better thought of as real experiments? 
 
 In real experiments, the unpredictable and novel character of the data is the source 
of the final experimental result. In a Monte Carlo simulation, the unpredictable and novel 
character of the random numbers is minimized and plays almost no role in the final result.  
 We should also guard against an equivocation on the term “experiment.” It may 
mislead us with the wrong sense of novelty. In one use of the term, “experiment” denotes 
any activity whose outcome is unknown at the outset. In that usage, generating a random 
number is an experiment, since we ought not to know which one will be recovered. 
Finding the square root of 234,398 would likewise count as an experiment. The use of 
“experiment” in this paper is narrower and epistemically richer. It denotes the activity of 
observing some arrangement in the world in order to discover how it will behave. It is 
empowered epistemically to provide knowledge of the world by a similarity of properties 
between the system on which we experiment and the target system of interest. 
 Thus, while the random numbers employed as intermediates in a Monte Carlo 
simulation may be unpredicted and unexpected, the sense of novelty is different from that 
associated with a real experiment. 
 
3. Derivations and arguments are transparent in that they are carried out by 
humans and can be grasped by them. Monte Carlo Simulations are opaque in that 
we humans cannot grasp the course of the simulations. So how can they be 
arguments? 
 
 There is no requirement that an argument be humanly comprehensible. All that is 
required is that it is a sequence of propositions conforming to the rules of the applicable 
logic. That the entirety can be encompassed and comprehended in all detail by a human 
mind is not required. 
 Modern mathematics is now well into a revolution in its methods that is 
dispensing with this feature of proofs. Theorems are being demonstrated by proofs that 
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are so complicated that no human can comprehend them. Thomas Hales (2005), for 
example, provided a proof of Kepler’s conjecture on the maximum density of the packing 
of spheres. The proof employed a computer to solve about 100,000 linear programming 
problems pertaining to different configurations of spheres. It was published only after 
scrutiny by a panel of 12 referees over four years, although they could not affirm the 
correctness of the entirety of the proof.21 
 
4. Monte Carlo simulations can employ physical randomizers such as coin 
tossers, roulette wheels, Buffon’s falling needles, Geiger counters, and so on. So 
why are these simulations not experiments on these physical randomizers? 
 
They fail to be experiments on these randomizers for two reasons. First, the point 
of an experiment is to discover something about the system upon which we experiment 
and, perhaps, to make an inference to other systems. But a Monte Carlo simulation does 
not produce any novel knowledge about the randomizer. Working scientists do not use 
the random numbers to learn about the randomizer.22 In fact, a well-designed Monte 
Carlo simulation will return a result that is largely independent of the physical 
randomizer used. Approximately the same result will be returned whether the randomizer 
is a coin tosser or a Geiger counter. An essential part of the good design of Monte Carlo 
simulation is to suppress any peculiarity of the particular randomizer used, while 
ensuring the presence of some predetermined, desired property, such as the uniformity of 
distribution of the random numbers over some interval.   
 Second, most Monte Carlo simulations use a pseudo-random number generator 
implemented in software. These simulations are clearly not experiments. Further, if 
                                                 
21 See Tymoczko, 1979 for philosophical reflections about computer-based proofs in mathematics.  
22 The only exception is when the random numbers from a randomizer are tested for their statistical 
properties. If an independence test fails, we do learn something about the randomizer, viz. that the trials are 
not independent. Such tests are necessary to underwrite the premise that the random numbers follow a 
certain probability model. However, such a test is not a proper part of every Monte Carlo simulation. Once 
we are confident that a certain randomizer produces random numbers with a certain distribution, we can use 
the randomizer without testing the random numbers actually produced.  
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physical randomizers are used in a simulation at all, they are entirely dispensable. They 
can always be replaced by a suitably designed pseudo-random number generator without 
any epistemic loss.23 Consequently, the physical randomizer is not the subject of the 
inquiry, and Monte Carlo simulations that use such a randomizer cannot be experiments 
on them.  
 
5. A Monte Carlo simulation produces its result using sample trajectories of 
concrete particulars. This is very different from other numerical techniques used 
to approximate solutions to equations. Thus, while other numerical methods can 
be understood as carrying out an inference, Monte Carlo integrations cannot.24 
  
 This objection misuses an analogy between real experiments and Monte Carlo 
simulations. Real experiments lead to results by generalizing from particulars, where the 
particulars are individual runs of a physical experiment. Monte Carlo simulations lead to 
results also by generalizing from particulars, where these particulars are computational 
surrogates of the individual runs of a physical experiment. The difference between the 
particulars is key. In the first case, the particulars are instances of the physical systems 
whose properties are sought. Hence their investigation conforms to the epistemic mode 
we have called “discovery” that is used by real experiments. In the second case, the 
instances are mere surrogates. As we have shown in Sec. 6, the surrogates are generated 
inferentially from assumptions about the target system. When they are combined with 
                                                 
23 A possible exception is a case in which it is known that a physical randomizer produces the right sort of 
random numbers, but in which the pertinent probability model is unknown such that one cannot generate 
the random numbers using software. This case is rather peculiar though and not typical of Monte Carlo 
simulations. In this peculiar case, we would not object to the suggestion that we have a real experiment. 
24 Humphreys (1994, 112) puts the objection thus: “It is the fact that they [Monte Carlo simulations] have 
a dynamical content due to being implemented on a real computational device that sets these models apart 
from ordinary mathematical models, because the solution process for generating the limit distribution is not 
one of abstract inference, but is available only by virtue of allowing the random walks themselves to 
generate the distribution.” Humphreys is here concerned with Monte Carlo simulations that trace a 
probability distribution. The particular interest is the final distribution.  
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further inferences in the Monte Carlo simulation, they yield the result of the simulation. 
Consequently, epistemically, the whole process of a Monte Carlo simulation is fully 
inferential.25 
 
6. Monte Carlo simulations must be experiments because they can take the same 
role as experiments.26  
 
That two things can take the same role does not show them to be identical. It only 
shows them to be similar in some aspect relevant to the role substitution. Experiments 
and Monte Carlo simulations still differ in the epistemic aspect of interest here. 
Experiments are powered epistemically by discovery and simulations by inference. 
 
7. Monte Carlo simulations allow one to manipulate the initial conditions as do 
experiments. Hence, Monte Carlo simulations are experiments.27 
 
Once again, two things that share a feature need not be the same. Hence, even 
though we can explore differing initial set-ups in experiments and in Monte Carlo 
simulations, this does not show that the latter are experiments. In simulations, the initial 
conditions are only set up in a model, and not in reality as it is the case in experiments.  
 
8. In a Monte Carlo simulation, things can go wrong in a physical sense. For 
instance, the physical randomizer or the hardware may fail to function in the way 
                                                 
25 It is true that drawing random numbers (particularly with the aid of a physical gambling device) is not 
an argument. But a Monte Carlo simulation is much more than drawing random numbers, and what is 
epistemologically decisive is inference, as we have argued in Sec. 4. 
26 For instance, Dietrich (1996) reports that certain Monte Carlo simulations were used as a benchmark for 
theoretical work in the same way experiments are (e.g. p. 341). 
27 As Dietrich (1996, p. 346) puts it, “Monte Carlo experiments share this basic structure of independent 
variables, dependent variables, and controlled parameters” known from experiments. 
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they are supposed to. This dependence on the physical implementation makes 
Monte Carlo simulations experiments.28 
 
We agree that we can only trust a simulation if we can trust that the physical 
randomizer and the hardware to function properly. But this does not imply that the 
simulation is an experiment on the randomizer and the computer hardware. We have 
already shown that the randomizer is not the subject of empirical discovery during a 
simulation. Nor is the computer hardware. The working scientist does not seek to learn 
about the processors of computers. Rather, the randomizer and the hardware are technical 
means to carry out a calculation. Clearly, the means have to work properly if the 
calculation is to be successful, and this explains why scientists who run simulations are 
concerned about failures of the randomizer or the hardware.  
The objection that we consider would also lead to implausible consequences. 
When a computer program like “Mathematica” calculates 4668570242 plus 6980836254, 
things can go wrong due to a hardware failure. But this does not show that the summation 
is an experiment. 
 
9. In analog simulations we carry out an experiment on one system to learn about a 
system to which it is (supposedly) formally analogous. So why are not Monte Carlo 
simulations analog simulations? They include an experiment on a randomizer; a 
formal analogy is then used to infer something about the target system.29   
 
Monte Carlo simulations are quite different from analog simulations. In a 
paradigmatic example of a formal analogy (Humphreys, 2004, pp. 125–29), two systems 
are well described using the same type of differential equation, e.g. an equation for a 
                                                 
28 This argument applies not just to Monte Carlo simulations, but to every computer simulation. See Parker 
(2009, pp. 488–91) for a similar argument.  
29 To outline the objection, we rely on a proposal due to Guala (2002, pp. 66–67) and an emendation by 
Winsberg (2010, pp. 57–58). A formal analogy contrasts with a material one. The distinction between both 
analogies goes back to Hesse (e.g. Hesse, 1966, p. 68). Consult also Trenholme (1994) for analog 
simulations. 
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damped harmonic oscillator. This fact can be used to make an inference from one system 
to the other. Things are different in typical Monte Carlo simulations. The randomizer 
(say, a roulette wheel) and the target of the simulations (say, a Brownian particle) do not 
obey the same type of equation. It need not even be the case that the outcomes of the 
randomizer and some aspect of the target follow the same probability distribution, for the 
random numbers from the randomizer are often transformed considerably by the 
simulation program. For instance, random numbers with a uniform distribution over [0,1] 
are transformed into random numbers with a normal distribution (e.g. James, 1980, 
pp. 1179–83). The outcome is that a formal analogy between the target and the 
randomizer is not required for the functioning of Monte Carlo simulations.  
  
8. Conclusion 
 Monte Carlo simulations are, we urge, merely rather complicated arguments and 
have no epistemic powers beyond those of an argument. We may well ask what we gain 
from this deflationary conclusion. For, we might say, Monte Carlo simulations are 
interesting in so far as they differ from our normal modes of investigation. Our 
deflationary conclusion merely identifies how they are the same. 
 We agree that there is much interesting novelty in Monte Carlo methods and 
much to be found in investigating how they differ from other modes. In particular, they 
deliver results that other methods find difficult or even impossible in practice; and they 
are distinctive in their dependence on the novel computational technology of our modern 
era. 
 The danger is that we are swept up by the excitement of this novelty into 
believing that we have found some qualitatively new mode of investigation. We read our 
deflationary result as placing a bound on these enthusiasms. It shows that the epistemic 
gains supplied by Monte Carlo simulations are pragmatic. They open no new epistemic 
channels.  
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